Labours Rent Controls Do Not Work
Labours rent controls in London and other major cities in the UK do not work, and there are many international examples of their failure.
That’s the message from the Residential Landlords Association, which says if London Labour mayor Sadiq Khan is successful at winning powers to introduce Labours rent controls, the capital’s private rental sector will be harmed.
Labour’s recent party conference also reiterated the party’s call for selective rent controls to be introduced in major cities outside of London too.
Now the RLA’s latest research shows a number of overseas examples of where this policy has backfired.
The association’s policy director David Smith says: “This research shows clearly that rent controls are not a panacea for tenants. Far from making renting cheaper, experience around the world shows it can make it more expensive and more difficult for those looking for a home to rent.
“Rather than resorting to simplistic and populist ideas which have shown themselves to fail, the Mayor should instead work with the vast majority of private landlords doing a good job to see what is needed to stimulate the delivery of more homes to rent. Increasing supply is by far the most effective way of keeping rents down.”
Here are the RLA’s international examples:
1. California: Forms of rent control exist in Los Angeles and San Francisco. A paper for the California Budget and Policy Centre has reported that renters are “substantially more likely to struggle with housing affordability than homeowners.” It goes on to note that: “More than half of renter households paid over 30% of income toward housing in 2017, and more than a quarter were severely cost-burdened, paying more than half of household income toward housing costs.” A further paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research has found that in San Francisco, landlords affected by rent control reduced rental housing supply by 15 per cent.
2. US: Research for the National Multi Housing Council in the United States (a body involved in the American equivalent of Build To Rent) warns that rent control and rent stabilisation laws “lead to a reduction in the available supply of rental housing in a community, particularly through the conversion to ownership of controlled buildings.”
3. EU: A document prepared for the European Commission has warned that rent controls “appear to have a significant destabilizing impact on the aggregate housing market, increasing the volatility of house prices when confronted with different shocks.” It goes on to note: “The drawbacks of rent controls in terms of unintended consequences for housing market stability and negative effects on labour mobility would advise against their use for redistribution purpose”.
4. Germany: In 2015, a rent control mechanism was introduced across Germany. The research cites evidence showing that between 2015 and 2017 rents in central Berlin increased by almost 10 per cent. Before the introduction of the control they had been rising by just one to two per cent each year. Research by the German Institute for Economic Research has concluded: “Contrary to the expectations of the policy makers, the rental brake has, at best, no impact in the short run. At worst, it even accelerates rent increases both in municipalities subject to the rental brake and in neighbouring areas.”
5. Italy: A paper for the Centre for the Analysis of Public Policies notes that the private supply of rental homes fell dramatically after a law regulating rent levels was introduced in 1978. A further paper has found that in Italy between 1998 and 2008, market rents increased by 57 per cent compared to a growth in household income of 31 per cent.
6. Sweden: A report by the International Monetary Fund this year concluded: “Tackling Sweden’s dysfunctional housing market requires reforms of rent controls, tax policies, and construction regulation. In addition to fully liberalizing rents of newly constructed apartments, there is a need to phase out existing controls, such as by applying market rents when there is a change in tenant.”